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Quiet Title Actions in Arkansas–A Primer
C. Michael Daily1
I. Introduction
Marketable title is a relevant topic for those involved in the oil and gas industry. The
Arkansas Title Standards define marketable title as follows:
[A] title free from reasonable doubt both as to matters of law and fact, a title
which a reasonable purchaser, well informed as to the facts and their legal
bearings and willing and ready to perform the contract, would, in the exercise of
that prudence which business persons ordinarily bring to bear upon such
transactions, be willing to accept and ought to accept. A marketable title is “not
only a title that. . . a purchaser can hold against all comers, but one that he can
hold without reasonable apprehension of it being assailed, and one that he can
readily transfer. . . in the market.2
According to one early Arkansas case, “reasonable doubt” exists when there is uncertainty as to
some defect that appears in the course of the deduction of title, and that doubt must be such as
affects the value of the land or that will interfere with its sale.3 More succinctly stated,
marketable title is “title which a reasonably prudent man would be willing to accept.”4
Marketable title is relevant to operating companies and mineral owners. The operating

1

Attorney and mediator, Daily & Woods, P.L.L.C., Fort Smith, Arkansas.

2

Standards for Examination of Real Estate Titles in Arkansas, § 1.1 (Arkansas Bar
Association, 2000) (citing 3 Am. L. Prop. § 11.48 (A. James Casner, et al. eds. 1952); Shelton v.
Ratteree, 1221 Ark. 482, 181 S.W. 288 (1915); see also Holt v. Manual, 186 Ark. 435 (1932)
(holding that the court will never compel a purchaser to take a title where the point on which it
depends is too doubtful to be settled without litigation or where the purchase would expose him
to the hazard of such proceedings or as it is usually expressed it will not compel him to buy a
lawsuit).
3

Holt v. Manual, 186 Ark. 435 (1932).

4

Paul E. Basye, Clearing Land Titles § 4 (1953).
1

companies conduct title research and request attorney title opinions so they may determine the
property ownership for a particular drilling unit. The scope of a title examination can vary based
on the client’s needs, but in all cases a title opinion will reveal surface, mineral and leasehold
ownership, expose defects in title, impose requirements and suggest curative measures. Once a
title defect is presented, a prudent oil and gas company should suspend payment of the mineral
royalties pending resolution. Mineral owners typically cannot receive their royalty check until
the title defect is removed.
The form of title curative can vary based on the circumstances. Simple title defects can
be resolved with minimal expense. Complicated title defects may involve multiple and adverse
parties and may require litigation to resolve the issues. In complicated cases, a quiet title suit is
effective curing title defects.
An action to quiet title is defined as a remedy sought by a party seeking to establish
marketable title or clear adverse claims.5 The remedy is rooted in equity. Even though statutory
quiet title procedures exist, a petitioner may also file a quiet title lawsuit pursuant to general
equity principles. After a brief review of the history of quiet title actions, this paper will explore
the statutory and common law procedures.
II. A Very Brief Historical Overview of Quiet Title Actions6
Quiet title actions were born in England. The English courts of law viewed title as

5

Standards for Examination of Real Estate Titles in Arkansas, Appendix “A”, 5(c)
(Arkansas Bar Association, 2000).
6

For a very extensive and thoughtful article covering the history and development of quiet
title actions, see Joe E. Covington, Bills to Remove Cloud on Title and Quieting Title in
Arkansas, 6 Ark. L. Rev. 83 (1952).
2

having one of two qualities: good or bad.7 There was no intermediate ground and a purchaser
could be compelled to take title, even though it was extremely doubtful because the concept of
unmarketable title had not yet been introduced.8 English Chancery Court rules were not as rigid.
Chancellors developed procedures, including the bill to remove a cloud on title, to aid a land
purchaser with a doubtful title when there was no other adequate remedy at law.9
For many years Arkansas maintained separate courts of law and equity. Quiet title
lawsuits were within the exclusive equity jurisdiction of the chancery courts. Several reported
quiet title cases involved the question of subject matter jurisdiction and distinction of cases
brought at law and in equity.10 In those cases, the court often wrestled with the factual distinction
between ejectment, a legal remedy and an action to quiet title.11 Some actions brought before the
wrong forum were either dismissed or transferred.12
The “watershed event”13 of 2000 eliminated the dual court system in Arkansas. Now, a

7

Basye, supra note 3, § 4.

8

Basye, supra note 3, § 4.

9

Basye, supra note 3, § 4; see also Covington, supra note 6 at 83-84

10

Liggett v. Church of Nazarene, 291 Ark. 298, 724 S.W.2d 170 (1987).

11

Id.

12

See generally Hesser v. Johns, 288 Ark. 264, 704 S.W.2d 165 (1986).

13

See In re Implementation of Amendment 80, 345 Ark Adv. App. (June 28, 2001). (“The
passage of Amendment 80 on November 7, 2000 was a watershed event in the history of the
Judicial Department of this state. Jurisdictional lines that previously forced cases to be divided
artificially and litigated separately in different courts have been eliminated. This fundamental
change brings with it a whole host of issues, both theoretical and practical, concerning the form
and structure of our court system.”); see also Larry Brady and J.D. Gingerich, A Practitioner’s
Guide to Arkansas’s New Judicial Article, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 715 (2002).
3

petitioner seeking to quiet title may file an action in the circuit court, a court of general
jurisdiction. The circuit court clerk assigns all cases pursuant to the particular plan adopted by
each judicial district and approved by the Supreme Court.14 A judge hearing the case has full
authority to rule on all issues brought before the court.15 Although Amendment 80 eliminated the
dual court system, it did not destroy the court’s equity jurisdiction. General equity principles still
apply to any quiet title case, including those brought pursuant to statute.
III. Procedures for Maintaining a Real Property Quiet Title Suit in Arkansas
Most jurisdictions permit a quiet title action to proceed to remove a cloud on interest in
real property. 16 Such property interests include surface rights, easements, minerals, timber or
water rights.17 Arkansas courts appear to be in accord with the general rule.
The General Assembly has enacted specific statutory procedures that apply to actions
quieting title to Federal land,18 proceedings to confirm public sales,19 and proceedings against
railroads.20 While a discussion of these specific laws are outside the scope of this paper, the rules
are relevant and should be followed closely in those limited situations.
The General Assembly has also created a statutory framework that applies generally to

14

Brady, supra note 12, at 722-23.

15

Id. at 720.

16

65 Am. Jur. 2d. Quieting Title §10 (2006).

17

Id.

18

28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2409, 1346, 1402, 1441.

19

See Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-601-610 (2003 & Supp. 2007).

20

See Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-701-708 (2003 & Supp. 2007).
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quiet title actions.21 At least one reported decision has held that these procedures relate to quiet
title actions that are not otherwise specifically provided for,22 but for reasons outlined below, this
may not be the case. In the situations where neither the general nor specific statutes apply, a
claimant may still initiate a quiet title action pursuant to the general equity principles under
common law.23
A.

Proceedings Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 18-50-501-511
Most statutory quiet title actions are brought pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. §18-60-501,

which states as follows:
Any person claiming to own land that is wild or improved or land that is in the
actual possession of himself or herself, or those under him or her, may have his or
her title to the land confirmed and quieted by proceeding in the manner provided
in this subchapter.24
Assuming the property interests at stake fall within the purview of the statute, the procedure and
rules set forth in this subsection serve as excellent guideposts to a party seeking relief. Whether
the statute applies to all incidents of property ownership that are capable of being quieted
requires more investigation.
1.

What Property Interests Can Be Quieted?

The statute clearly applies to quiet title actions involving “land.” “Land”, in this case,
definitely includes surface property ownership rights as well as any subsurface rights that are

21

See Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-501-511 (2003 & Supp. 2007).

22

Ex parte Morrison, 69 Ark. 517, 64 S.W. 270 (1901).

23

Covington, supra note 5, at 83; 65 Am. Jur. 2d. Quieting Title § 8 (2006).

24

Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-501 (2003).
5

incidentally attached. Whether the word “land” applies to a severed mineral interest, however,
requires additional consideration. Although some reported Arkansas Supreme Court decisions
have held that an owner of the mineral estate is a landowner,25 other judicial decisions indicate
that such a simplistic rule can be deceiving. A proper determination can be made by
investigating these cases and following commonly accepted rules of statutory construction.
The first rule of statutory construction is to apply a plain reading to the statute, construing
it just as it reads, by giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common
language.26 When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to
rules of statutory construction.27 When a statute is clear, a court will not search for legislative
intent; rather, that intent must be gathered from the plain meaning of the language used.28
Assuming that a plain reading of the statute is possible, there is no reason to believe that a
court would apply the general statutory procedure to an action involving a severed mineral
interest. The statute only applies to actions involving “land that is wild or improved or land that
is in the actual possession of himself or herself.” The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that
statutes regarding the payment of taxes on “wild and unimproved land” for the purposes of
acquiring title to minerals by adverse possession are inapplicable to minerals because minerals

25

El Paso Production Co. v. Blanchard, No. 061107 (Ark. 12/06/2007) (stating that a
mineral owner is properly considered a "landowner."); see also Schnitt v. McKellar, 244 Ark.
377, 427 S.W.2d 202 (1968) (holding that the interest of a mineral owner was an interest in
land).
26

Cave City Nursing Home, Inc. v. Ark. Dept. of Human Servs., 351 Ark. 13, 89 S.W.3d
884 (2002); City of Fort Smith, Arkansas v. Carter, ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2008).
27

Id.

28

Id.
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within the earth are not susceptible of inclosure.29 If a mineral is not “land that is wild”, there is
no logical reason to consider it improved land either.30 For this subsection to have any
application to a severed mineral estate, the mineral estate must fall within “land that is in the
actual possession of himself or herself.”31
Actual possession of a mineral estate is complicated. One must actually possess the
minerals themselves.32 Possession of the surface is insufficient.33 In the context of oil and
natural gas, actual adverse possession of the minerals can only occur by opening mines and
operating the same.34 Based on the limited factual circumstances where actual possession could
occur, it is fair to conclude that a severed mineral interest is not a property interest that is capable
of being quieted pursuant to the general quiet title procedure.
An argument could be made that Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-601 is ambiguous and open to
two or more interpretations, requiring more thorough statutory construction. If this is the case,
then the intent of the legislature must be ascertained.35 Legislative intent is to be derived from

29

Brizzolara v. Powell, 214 Ark. 870, 218 S.W.2d 728 (1949).

30

See Blacks Law Dictionary, 761 (7th ed. 199) (defining improved land as real property
that has been developed).
31

See Covington, supra note 5 at 97 (indicating that a lawsuit brought pursuant to this
section can only be maintained by a plaintiff who is in possession of the property).
32

See Bonds v. Carter, 348 Ark. 591, 75 S.W.3d 192 (2002).

33

Id.

34

Id.

35

Graham v. Forrest City Housing Authority, 304 Ark. 632, 803 S.W.2d 923 (1991).
7

the legislative body that enacted the law.36 Even if the statute is ambiguous, this subsection is
still inapplicable to an action to quiet title to a severed mineral interest. The basis for this
conclusion is grounded in another rule of Arkansas property37–the Strohacker doctrine.
In Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., Thompson, Trustee v. Strohacker, it was held that in
construing conveyances that purported to reserve mineral rights, the intent of the parties was to
be determined so as to be consistent with and limited to minerals commonly known and
recognized by legal or commercial usage in the area where the instrument was executed.38 At
issue in Strohacker was the court’s interpretation of a reservation of “mineral deposits” in a deed
executed by the railroad in 1892 and 1893 in Miller County, Arkansas. The Supreme Court
ultimately concluded that a reservation of “mineral deposits” was ineffective to reserve oil and
gas because oil and gas were not minerals commonly known and recognized by legal or
commercial usage at the time and place of the conveyance. Strohacker has been revisited on a
few occasions. In one case, the court held that a generic reservation of “minerals” in 1990 in
Union County did not effectively reserve oil and gas,39 and in another, the court held that a

36

Baxter v. McGee, 82 F.2d 695, cert. denied 298 U.S. 680 (1936); see also Doe v. Baum,
348 Ark. 259, 72 S.W.3d 476 (2002) (holding that in ascertaining an act’s intent, the court
examines the statute historically, as well as the contemporaneous conditions at the time of the
enactment, the object to be accomplished, the remedy to be provided, the consequences of
interpretation, and matters of common knowledge within the court’s jurisdiction).
37

See Gerald L. DeLung, The Strohacker Doctrine - An Arkansas Rule of Property, 14th
Annual Oil and Gas Institute (Arkansas Bar Association, 1975).
38

Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., Thompson, Trustee v. Strohacker, 202 Ark. 645, 152
S.W.2d 557 (1941); see also Ahne v. Reinhart and Donovan Co., 240 Ark. 691, 401 S.W.2d 565
(1966).
39

Stegall v. Bush, 228 Ark. 632, 310 S.W.2d 251 (1958).
8

reservation of “all of the coal, oil and minerals” in 1905 in Logan County did effectively reserve
natural gas.
In Schuman v. Certain Lands40, the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed whether the
General Assembly intended for the word “land,” as used in the statutory procedure for the
quieting of title to lands acquired through public sale, to apply to a severed mineral interest. The
claimants preceded pursuant to Ark. Stat. 34-1918, which provided, in relevant part, as follows:
“purchasers. . . of lands made by the County Clerk, or by the Commissioner of
State Lands, . . . may protect themselves from eviction of the lands so purchased,
or from any responsibility as possessors of them, by proceeding in the manner
provided in this subchapter.”41
This Act was originally enacted in 1836 and amended in 1881, however, the 1881
amendment only inserted and substituted the words “County Clerk, or by the State Land
Commissioner” for the words “by the Auditor of the State.” The statute used the word “land”,
without any mention or reference to mineral rights. Citing Strohacker, the Court held that this
procedure was inapplicable to an action involving a severed mineral interest because it was
unreasonable to suppose that the legislature, in 1836, intended for the word “land” to include an
undivided interest in minerals.42 Not only is Strohacker a unique rule of Arkansas property, but
apparently it is also a rule of statutory construction.
Based on Schuman, it is consistent to also conclude that no action to quiet title to a
severed mineral interest could be brought pursuant to Ark. Code Ann § 18-60-501. Similar to the

40

223 Ark. 85, 264 S.W.2d 413 (1954).

41

See Ark. Stat. 34-1918, now codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-601.

42

See Schuman v. Certain Lands, 223 Ark. 85, 264 S.W.2d 413 (1954).
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statute in Schuman, the 1899 original enactment of Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-50143 also only
apply to “land.” The statute has been amended twice, first by Acts 1927, No. 64, and most
recently by Acts 2007, No. 1037. Neither amendment added any provisions relating to mineral
interests. If Schuman is any guide, this subsection cannot apply to a quiet title action involving a
severed mineral interest.
Since a claimant to a severed mineral interest has no specific statutory authority to
pursue, he may only bring a petition to quiet title pursuant to the general equity principles.44 For
a claimant who is seeking to quiet title to property covered by the statute, he may proceed
pursuant to the rules stated in Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-501-511.
2.

Pleadings and Proof

Arkansas is a fact pleading state, thus a petitioner must allege sufficient facts to state a
claim.45 Otherwise, his petition may be subject to dismissal.46 Strict compliance with Ark. Code
Ann. § 18-60-502 should satisfy the factual pleading requirements. According to the statute:
A claimant shall file in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the county in
which the land is situated a petition describing the land and stating facts which
show a prima facie right and title to the land in himself or herself and that there is
no adverse occupant thereof.47
In counties with multiple judicial districts, the petition should be filed in the appropriate county

43

Acts 1899, No. 79.

44

See Section III(B), infra.

45

Ark. R. Civ. P. 8 (2007).

46

Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (2007).

47

Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-502(a) (Supp. 2007)
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seat.
The petitioner may include multiple tracts in the same petition as long as they all lie in the
same county. 48 The rules applicable to legal descriptions in conveyances should also apply to the
petition to quiet title. The petitioner, if possible, should describe the land with specificity,
however, a precise legal description may not always be necessary. The land should be described
with sufficient certainty to identify the land, and a court will typically not find that a legal
description is void if, by any reasonable construction, the land can be identified.49 However, the
word “part” should not be used to describe a tract of land if at all possible. It has been held that
the word “part” invalidates a legal description unless the description continues and specifically
describes the precise part intended.50
The petitioner has the burden of proof in establishing that he is entitled to a quiet title
decree.51 If possible, the petitioner should present evidence of a perfect claim of title to the
property. A perfect claim of title includes continuous uninterrupted conveyances of the property
that date back to the United States patent. If the petitioner cannot show a perfect claim of title,
prima facie title can be shown if the petitioner can prove that he, and those under whom he
claims, have had color of title to the land for more than seven years; and during that time the

48

Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-502(c) (Supp. 2007).

49

Ingram v. Luther, 244 Ark. 260, 424 S.W.2d 546 (1968); Snyder v. Bridewell, 167 Ark.
8, 267 S.W. 561 (1924).
50

See generally Browning v. Hicks, 243 Ark. 394, 420 S.W.2d 545 (1967); Dierks
Forests, Inc. v. Garrett, 242 Ark. 223, 412 S.W.2d 849 (1967); see also Standards for
Examination of Real Estate Titles in Arkansas, 21.3 (Arkansas Bar Association, 2000).
51

Ark. & Ozarks R.Y. Corp. v. West, 234 Ark. 590, 353 S.W.2d 337 (1962); Bullock v.
Duerson, 95 Ark. 445, 129 S.W. 1083 (1910).
11

petitioner, or those under whom he claims, have continuously paid the taxes on the tracts that are
the subject of the petition.52
The Arkansas appellate courts have detailed the characteristics of color of title as follows:
Color of title is not, in law, title at all. It is a void paper, having the semblance of a
muniment of title, to which, for certain purposes, the law attributes certain
qualities of title. Its chief office or purpose is to define the limits of the claim
under it. Nevertheless, it must purport to pass title. In form, it must be a deed, a
will, or some other paper or instrument by which title usually and ordinarily
passes. Such qualities as are imputed to it by the law, for limited purposes, are
purely fictitious and are accorded to it only to work out just results. Fictions are
never used in procedure or law for any other purpose.53
Color of title cannot be manufactured between parties with knowledge of their lack of title.54 It
has been held that a certificate of purchase issued at a tax sale is not color of title.55 Where the
minerals had been previously severed, a void tax deed issued from the State of Arkansas, has
been held to be color of title to the surface estate, but not color of title to the underlying mineral
estate.56
Proof of payment of taxes can be shown by attaching tax receipts as exhibits. The

52

Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-506 (2003).

53

Jones v. Barger, 67 Ark. App. 337, 1 S.W.3d 31 (1999); see also Weast v. Hereinafter
Described Lands, 33 Ark. App. 157, 803 S.W.2d 565 (1991).
54

Weast v. Hereinafter Described Lands, 33 Ark. App. 157, 803 S.W.2d 565 (1991)
(quoting State v. King, 77 W. Va. 37, 87 S.E. 170 (1915): To permit [color of title] to become
the shield and protection of admitted fabrication of papers having the muniments of title, such as
forged deeds and wills and deeds made by men having no titles, at the instance of persons having
knowledge of their lack of title, for the express purpose of founding claims thereon, would be a
flagrant perversion of it to unworthy purposes and a departure from the judicial intent and design
in the adoption thereof).
55

Broadhead v. McEntire, 19 Ark. App. 259, 720 S.W.2d 313 (1986).

56

Skelly Oil Company v. Johnson, 209 Ark. 1107, 194 S.W.2d 425 (1946).
12

statutes also permit live or deposition testimony in support of a claim.57 Failure to allege and
subsequently prove color of title and continuous payments of taxes will preclude the court from
granting relief.58
3.

Parties and Notice

All parties with any incidental claim to the property should be considered a necessary
and indispensable party to an action to quiet title. The failure to join such a party can result in
dismissal of the case and can render any order quieting title void ab initio.59 The quiet title
petition filed pursuant to the statutory rules must include the name of any party as a defendant,
that the petitioner has knowledge of, who claims an interest to the land.60 Any potential claimant
that is within the petitioner’s own chain of title should be named as a party.61 Furthermore, the
recent amendment to Ark. Code Ann § 18-60-502 imposes additional research upon a petitioner.
Now, the petitioner must initiate a search of all of the following records in order to identify
persons entitled to notice of the lawsuit:
(A) Land title records in the office of the county recorder;
(B) Tax records in the office of the county collector;
(C) Tax records in the office of the county treasure;
(D) Tax records in the office of the county assessor;
(E) For an individual, records of the probate court for the county in which the
property is located;
(F) For an individual, voter registration records maintained by the Secretary of

57

Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-505(b) (2003).

58

Brown v. Minor, 305 Ark. 556, 810 S.W.2d 334 (1991).

59

See Koonce v. Mitchell, 341 Ark. 716, 19S.W.3d 603 (2000).

60

Ark. Code Ann. §18-60-502(3) (Supp. 2007).

61

Union Sawmill Co. v. Rowland, 178 Ark. 372, 10 S.W.2d 858 (1928).
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State;
(G) For a partnership, partnership records filed with the county clerk; and
(H) For a business entity other than a partnership, business entity records filed
with the Secretary of State.62
Any person discovered through this search who may have a claim to the property should be
named as a party.
Once the petitioner has determined the necessary parties to summon to the action, he must
properly effectuate service of the petition and summons. Although Rule 4 of the Arkansas Rules
of Civil Procedure typically governs the service of process in civil cases, the amendment to Ark.
Code Ann. §18-60-502 creates additional requirements. The petitioner is required to send notice
by certified mail to the defendant’s last known address in duplicate, with one copy addressed by
name to the person entitled to notice and the other copy addressed to “occupant”.63 If the
certified mail is returned undelivered, the petitioner must send a second notice by regular mail.64
Also, the petitioner is required to post a notice of the pending quiet title action conspicuously on
the property.65
If personal service on known defendants cannot be accomplished through actual service,
the warning order procedure is available pursuant to Rule 4(f). This rule permits constructive

62

Ark. Code Ann. §18-60-502(b)(1) (2003).

63

Ark. Code Ann. §18-60-502(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 2007).

64

Ark. Code Ann. §18-60-502(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 2007).

65

Ark. Code Ann. §18-60-502(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 2007); The updated notice procedures also
make reference only to “land”, which further supports the argument that this subsection cannot
apply to a severed mineral interest.
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service only if the whereabouts of a defendant is unknown after diligent inquiry.66 Proof that a
petitioner has made a diligent search likely requires an affidavit stating that the petitioner has
made a thorough search of the records listed in Ark. Code Ann. §18-60-502(b)(1). Exact
compliance with the warning order procedure is required.67
The statutory procedure for quieting title also requires publication of notice of the
pendency of the suit.68 This procedure differs from the warning order procedure, in that it
appears to effectuate constructive notice on unknown claimants of the land, rather than the known
and named defendants who cannot be located after a diligent inquiry. The publication statute
states:
Upon the filing of the petition to quiet title, the clerk of the court is charged with
publishing a notice of the filing of the petition on the same day of each week, for
four (4) weeks in some newspaper published in the county, if there is one, and if
not, then in some newspaper having a circulation in the county. 69 The petition
shall describe the land and call upon all persons who claim an interest in the land
or lien thereon to appear in the court and show cause why the title of the petitioner
should not be confirmed.70 The circuit court within the proper county is authorized
and empowered under the notice to find apparent existing liens on the real estate
to be barred by the laws of limitation or laches, and decree the cancellation of said
liens and records thereof.71

66

Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(f) (2007); Smith v. Edwards, 279 Ark. 79, 648 S.W.2d 482 (1983).

67

Black v. Merritt, 37 Ark. App. 5, 822 S.W.2d 853 (1992).

68

Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-503(a)(1) (2003).

69

Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-503(a)(1) (2003).

70

Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-503(a)(2) (2003); see Koonce v. Mitchell, 341 Ark. 716, 19
S.W.3d 603 (2000).
71

Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-503(b) (2003).
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The four week publication requirement is mandatory.72 Once proof of the publication is
filed, the petitioner may attempt to prove his allegations.73 In the absence of compliance with the
notice requirements of § 18-60-503(a), the petitioner cannot make a prima facie case to quiet
title.74 Failure to comply with the statute results in the trial court lacking subject-matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate the rights to the property. 75
The petitioner should also cause a notice of lis pendens to be recorded in the county real
estate records. The Arkansas lis pendens statute states as follows:
To render the filing of any suit at law or in equity in either a state court or United
States district court affecting the title or any lien on real estate or personal
property constructive notice to a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee of any such
real estate or personal property, it shall be necessary for the plaintiff or any one (1)
of the plaintiffs, if there is more than one (1) plaintiff, or his or her attorney or
agent to file a notice of the pendency of the suit, for record with the recorder of
deeds of the county in which the property to be affected by the constructive notice
is situated.76
This notice places bona fide purchasers or mortgagees on notice that the title to certain

72

Crain v. Burns, 82 Ark. App. 88, 112 S.W.3d 371 (2003) (holding that warning order
that was only published for two weeks did not comply with statute and therefore petitioner could
not quiet title).
73

Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-505(a) (2003).

74

Crain v. Burns, 82 Ark.App. 88, 112 S.W.3d 371 (2003); Eason v. Flannigan, 349 Ark.
1, 75 S.W.3d 702 (2002).
75

Crain v. Burns, 82 Ark.App. 88, 112 S.W.3d 371 (2003); Koonce v. Mitchell, 341 Ark.
716, 19 S.W.3d 603 (2000); but see Boyd v. Roberts, 98 Ark. App. 385, ___, S.W.3d ___ (2007)
(holding that Koonce had no application in a dispute involving the location of a single boundary
between two parcels of land, one of which was undisputably owned by one party and one which
was undisputably owned by another party).
76

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-59-101 (2005).
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real or personal property is being litigated.77 A lis pendens has the effect of keeping the subject
matter of the lawsuit in controversy.78 Assuming a lis pendens has been filed, a person who
subsequently acquires property that is subject to litigation will take that property subject to the
rights of the parties to the litigation and will be bound by the litigation as if he was a party. 79
4.

The Decree

If no party appears to defend against the petition, then in an appropriate case, the
petitioner can have his title quieted by default.80 Where the pleadings are uncontroverted, the
court may render a decree of confirmation.81 This decree establishing and quieting title is
binding against all persons, with only a few exceptions. The decree is ineffective to bar the
rights of one who claims, under or by virtue of any contract with the petitioner, who was an
adverse occupant of the land at the time the petition was filed82, or who within seven years
preceding had paid the taxes on the land83, or a remainderman unless the person was a named
defendant was personally summoned.84
The statutory period to set aside the quiet title decree is three years. Within that time, a

77

Bill's Printing, Inc. v. Carder, 161 S.W.3d 803, 357 Ark. 242 (2004).
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Mitchell & Shaw v. The Fed. Land Bank of St. Louis, 206 Ark. 253, 174 S.W.2d 671
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Ark. R. Civ. P. 55 (2007).
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Stewart v. First Com. Bank, 59 Ark. App. 47, 953 S.W.2d 592 (1997).
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See Hargis v. Lawrence, 135 Ark. 321, 204 S.W. 755 (1918).
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See Hensley v. Phillips, 215 Ark. 543, 221 S.W.2d 412 (1949).
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Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-508 (2003).

(1943).
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person with a “meritorious defense” may appear and cause the decree to be set aside.85 One court
has held that a party prejudiced by the invalidity of a tax sale has a meritorious defense to a quiet
title decree.86 Disability tolls the running of the statute of limitations until the disability has been
removed.87
After the three year period has expired, a confirmation decree rendered pursuant to Ark.
Code Ann. §§ 18-60-501-511 is immune from collateral attack, except for jurisdictional defects
apparent on the face of the record.88 The decree may still be directly attacked by a plenary suit
having for its specific purpose the setting aside of the decree for fundamental errors such as fraud
or lack of jurisdiction, which would render the decree void ab initio.89 Failure to provide
adequate notice to a property owner is a violation of the fundamental right to due process and is
grounds to set aside a confirmation sale.90
B.

Proceeding Pursuant to General Equity Principles

85

Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-510(a) (2003).
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United States v. Williams, 109 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Ark. 1952).
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Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-510(b) (2003).
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See Verkamp v. Floyd E. Sagely Props., 96 Ark. App. 61, ___, S.W.3d ___ (2006)
(citing Champion v. Williams, 165 Ark. 328, 264 S.W. 972 (1924); Kulbeth v. Drew County
Timber Co., 125 Ark. 291, 188 S.W. 810 (1916)); see also Buckhannan v. Nash, 216 F. Supp.
843 (E.D. Ark. 1963).
89

See Verkamp v. Floyd E. Sagely Props., 96 Ark. App. 61, ___, S.W.3d ___ (2006); Hall
v. Blanford, 254 Ark. 590, 494 S.W.2d 714 (1973) (holding that an action by claimants who were
not made parties to the original action deemed a direct attack on the judgment and permissible);
see also Buckhannan v. Nash, 216 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Ark. 1963).
90

See e.g. Jones v. Flowers,126 S. Ct. 1708, 547 U.S. 220, 164 L. Ed.2d 415 (2006)
(Recent United States Supreme Court decision invalidating Arkansas’s tax sale notice
procedures).
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The statutory procedures outlined above did not eliminate the general equitable remedy
available under common law. For those cases brought pursuant to general equity principles,
many of the rules relating to the proper naming of parties, drafting of pleadings, service of
process and providing published notice should be followed, even if not explicitly required.
Although the traditional rules for notice and service of process under the Arkansas Rules of Civil
Procedure may appear adequate, it would be a sound practice for a petitioner to still conduct a
diligent search of the various records listed under Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-502(b) and to make a
valiant effort to effectuate adequate notice, if at all possible. These efforts should be
documented. The procedures suggested under Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-502(b)(2) and (b)(3) may
eventually accomplish actual notice or at the very least prevent a subsequent constitutional
challenge.
The primary difference between an action brought pursuant to statute and brought
pursuant to general equity principles is the quantum of proof required to show entitlement to a
quiet title decree. While the statutory procedure allows a petitioner to maintain a lawsuit even if
he cannot show a perfect claim of title, the common law action requires a showing of legal title to
the property involved.91 Typically, a showing of actual possession is also required,92 however, in
cases where no party has actual possession, or where a petitioner has no adequate remedy at law,
the equity jurisdiction of the court may intervene to quiet title to a petitioner.93
To be entitled to a decree quieting title in an adversary suit under general equity
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Brown v. Minor, 305 Ark. 556, 810 S.W.2d 334 (1991).
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Jackson v. Frazier, 175 Ark. 421, 299 S.W. 738 (1927).

93

McKim v. McLiney, 250 Ark. 423, 465 S.W.2d 911 (1971).
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principles, the plaintiff must deraign title from the government or from someone who is shown to
be the owner of the land by possession and/or payment of taxes.94 Deraigment of title from the
government requires proof of a continuous chain of title from the sovereign. If a party asserts to
own title independent of a common source, the petitioner must recover on the strength of his own
title.95 Where the parties trace their title to a common source, the prevailing party is the one who
has the superior equity. 96 In such a case, a party is not permitted to attempt to impeach the
common source.97
To quiet title by showing adverse possession, the petitioner must prove that his
possession was actual, open, notorious, continuous, hostile, exclusive, and accompanied with
intent to hold against the true owner for the statutory period.98 The adverse possessor must also
hold color of title to the claimed property for seven years and prove that he has paid taxes over
the same period.99
A surface claimant can clearly maintain a quiet title action based on adverse possession if
the above requirements are met, however, adverse possession of a mineral estate is more difficult
to prove. As previously stated, actual possession of a mineral estate is complicated. The only
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Coulter v. O’Kelly, 226 Ark. 836, 295 S.W.2d 753 (1956).
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Coulter v. O’Kelly, 226 Ark. 836, 295 S.W.2d 753 (1956); Eickhoff v. Scott, 137 Ark.
170, 208 S.W. 421 (1918).
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Eickhoff v. Scott, 137 Ark. 170 (1918).
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Id.
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Potlach Corp. V. Richardson, 278 Ark. 498, 647 S.W.2d 438 (1983).

99

Ark. Code Ann. § 18-11-106(a)(1)(A) (2003).
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manner in which a party may claim adverse possession of the minerals is by opening a mine and
producing the minerals for the statutory period.100 There is also indication that the adverse
possession of one mineral would not necessarily result in the adverse possession of the remaining
minerals.101 The Arkansas Supreme Court has recognized that title to minerals may be
quieted.102 However, since adverse possession is impractical, it appears that a court may only
quiet title to a severed mineral interest by proving actual title that dates back to the sovereign or
to a common source.
IV. Conclusion
A quiet title action is effective in resolving title disputes and clearing title defects.
Whether a party proceeds under statutory authority or pursuant to general equity principles, the
quiet title decree is very effective by adjudicating the rights of all possible claimants to property.
Still, a quiet title lawsuit is not suitable for all situations. If a title defect can be cured
outside of litigation, there are highly effective and inexpensive alternatives available. While the
curative measure ultimately used will undoubtably vary from based on the circumstances, the
cost and effectiveness of the particular method should always be considered.
Minor defects can be cured with simple remedies: A scrivener’s error can be cured by
correcting and re-recording the instrument;103 a gap in the chain of title can be cured by obtaining
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and recording missing documents;104 affidavits of occupancy and use105 and affidavits of death
and heirship106 are also useful. Assuming that the affiant is credible and would not be
incompetent to testify, affidavits are very cost-effective in resolving simple title defects.107 Even
time itself can cure a title defect.
Still, other situations may require extensive curative efforts. While a stray deed in an
otherwise clear chain of title can typically be ignored, a stray deed that begins its own very
lengthy title chain cannot. Stray deeds and tax sales that purport to convey or sever mineral
interests should be viewed with caution. Even though the parties could execute a stipulated
agreement to remedy the title defect, rarely will such an amicable situation present itself. Absent
a stipulated agreement, litigation may be the only viable option. In such a case, one may ask the
court to quiet his title.
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